

CONDITIONALITY, FACTORS AND INDICATORS OF HETEROGENEITY AND TYPOLOGIZATION OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The article is dedicated to analyzing the conditionality, factors and indicators of heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidential system of government. Attention is focused on the fact that semi-presidentialism is formally (institutionally and procedurally) and factually (politically and behaviorally) a heterogeneous system of government, and therefore it must be subjected to a comprehensive typologization and taxonomy. Since different types of semi-presidentialism, having positives (advantages) and negatives (disadvantages) and generating different risks and prospects, have dissimilar effects on inter-institutional relations, political process, dynamics of political regime change, political stability and socio-economic efficiency. In this regard, the author singled out the main taxonomies of semi-presidentialism into: president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism; unified majority system, divided majority system, divided minority system and unified minority system; presidentialized (highly presidentialized), premierized (parliamentarized) and balanced semi-presidentialism. In addition, the article traces the clusters of typologizations of semi-presidentialism and different approaches to their content. Therefore, it is argued that hypothetically there is no reason to speak of any established and perfect model of semi-presidentialism, even if it is concentrated in one region or one part of the world. Consequently, it makes no sense to compare semi-presidentialism as a whole, but instead it is much more efficient to appeal to its formal, factual and both formal and factual types/attributes as well as to political and socio-economic consequences caused by them.

Keywords: system of government, semi-presidential system of government, heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism, typologization of semi-presidentialism, president, governmental cabinet, prime minister, parliament.

Віталій Литвин

ЗУМОВЛЕНІСТЬ, ЧИННИКИ Й ІНДИКАТОРИ ГЕТЕРОГЕННОСТІ І ТИПОЛОГІЗАЦІЇ НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКОЇ СИСТЕМИ ПРАВЛІННЯ

У статті проаналізовано зумовленість, чинники й індикатори гетерогенності і типологізації напівпрезидентської системи правління. Увагу сконцентровано на тому, що

напівпрезиденталізм формально (інституційно і процесуально) та фактично (політично і поведінково) є гетерогенною системою правління, а тому повинен піддаватись усесторонній типологізації і таксономії. Адже різні типи напівпрезиденталізму, маючи позитиви/переваги і негативи/недоліки й породжуючи різні ризики та перспективи, неоднаково впливають на міжінституційні відносини, політичний процес, динаміку зміни політичного режиму, політичну стабільність та соціально-економічну ефективність. У зв'язку із цим, виокремлено магістральні таксономії напівпрезиденталізму на: президент-парламентаризм та прем'єр-президенталізм; системи уніфікованої більшості, розділеної більшості, розділеної меншості та уніфікованої меншості; президентціалізований (високопрезидентціалізований), прем'єризований (парламентаризований) та збалансований. Крім того, прослідковано кластери типологізацій напівпрезиденталізму і різні підходи до їхнього наповнення. Аргументовано, що гіпотетично нема підстав говорити про певну встановлену й ідеальну модель напівпрезиденталізму, навіть якщо вона сконцентрована в одному регіоні чи одній частині світу. Отже, немає сенсу порівнювати напівпрезиденталізм у цілому, а натомість набагато ефективніше апелювати до його формальних, фактичних та формальних і фактичних типів/ознак, а також до політичних та соціально-економічних наслідків, спричинених ними.

Ключові слова: система правління, напівпрезидентська система правління, гетерогенність напівпрезиденталізму, типологізації напівпрезиденталізму, президент, урядовий кабінет, прем'єр-міністр, парламент.

Institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism give relevant grounds to argue that this system of government is or at least can be extremely diverse, and therefore it requires a comprehensive analysis of the conditionality, factors and indicators of its heterogeneity, typologization and taxonomy. This is even obvious given the almost common *definition of semi-presidentialism* as a system of government, which consists of such mandatory and separate attributes/ characteristics as: a) the existence of the institution of president (it does not matter whether individual or collective one, but necessarily as the head of state, although possibly both as the head of state and the head of the executive) that receives its power for a fixed term on the basis of popular (in particular, direct or indirect one) election outside the legislature and is not responsible to the legislature; b) the existence of the institutions of prime minister (not mandatory as the head of the executive, but necessarily as the head of governmental cabinet) and its governmental cabinet that do not gain powers for a fixed term on the basis of popular (in particular, direct or indirect) election outside the legislature, but are necessarily collectively responsible (in particular, based on the parliamentary votes of investiture and/or no confidence) to at least the legislature (or both to the legislature and the head of state); c) combination and dualization of the executive by a president (necessarily as the head

of state) and a prime minister (necessarily as the head of governmental cabinet) with his or her governmental cabinet¹. Such a definition of semi-presidentialism is largely proposed on the basis of a synthesis of the existing interpretations of the analyzed system of government, mainly in the researches of R. Elgie² and G. Sartori³. Consequently, the argument offered at the beginning of our study is extremely important given the fact that different types of semi-presidentialism (and other systems of government), being endowed with their own positives (advantages) and negatives (disadvantages), as well as creating different risks and prospects, theoretically and methodologically can have different effects on inter-institutional relations, political process, the dynamics of political regimes change, the indicators of political stability and socio-economic efficiency⁴. Therefore, it is obvious that scientific analysis of semi-presidential (or any other) system of government should be carried out as a comparison of the influences and consequences of different types of semi-presidentialism instead of understanding it as a whole.

All this corresponds to the theoretical and methodological remark of A. Bebler, according to which it is hardly to expect and imagine any progress in comparative Political Science without *classifications and typologizations*⁵. This is due to the fact that Political Science classifications and typologizations (in particular, on the problems of political institutions and processes, including systems of government) are particularly important for the scientific discipline itself, as there is no general theory of policy and politics all researchers would agree with. Moreover, as distinguished by T. Landman⁶, G. Sartori⁷ and O. Zaznaev⁸, typologizations or classifications are necessary elements of systematization of knowledge on a particular problem, and therefore make the world of politics and inter-institutional relations less complex, in particular by giving a researcher “data containers”, which organize empirical facts.

As for the conditionality, factors and indicators of *heterogeneity and typologization of semi-presidentialism*, the scientific position of P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones, according to which the issue of diversification of this system of government is intrinsic and objectively initial, turns out to be rational one⁹. The fact is that scholars from the very beginning of the idea of semi-presidentialism as a new constitutional and political type have not argued the difference and disposition of the phenomenon of this system of government in the perspective of the

¹ Lytvyn V., Do otsiniuvannia klasychnykh i postklasychnykh ta formulivannia onovlenoho i syntetychnoho vyznachen napivprezidentalizmu, “*Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho universytetu: Filosofiia, sotsiologiia, politologiia*” 2016, nr. 3 (31), s. 30–46.

² Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 13.

³ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997, s. 131.

⁴ Elgie R., *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 1–13.

⁵ Bebler A., *Introduction*, [w:] Bebler A., Seroka J. (eds.), *Contemporary Political Systems. Classifications and Typologies*, Wyd. Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990, s. 6.

⁶ Landman T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2003, s. 5.

⁷ Sartori G., Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, “*American Political Science Review*” 1970, vol. 64, nr. 4, s. 1039.

⁸ Zaznaev O., *Klassifikatsii prezidentskoy, parlamentskoy i poluprezidentskoy sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Kazan 2006, s. 186–210.

⁹ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol. 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

concept of representation, including the notion of representative democracy. As a result, the debates over the conceptual status of semi-presidentialism proved to be one of the longest in contemporary Political Science, but they did not immediately substantiate the variability of this type of inter-institutional relations. The reason is that initially (even referring to the researches of M. Duverger¹⁰) it was clear that semi-presidentialism is determined and diversified at least bilaterally, i.e. formally (based on institutional and procedural attributes) and factually (based on political and behavioral attributes)¹¹. Scholars (especially J. Linz¹², M. Shugart and J. Carey¹³) followed a similar logic even some time later when they began to appeal to different constitutional and political understandings of semi-presidentialism. On the other hand, it was not substantiated that the heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism is objective (rather than relative) theoretically, methodologically and empirically, and therefore does not turn this constitutional and political type into an empty analytical set and residual category. In total, this generated two scientific problems. The first one revolves around the differences between the nature and logics of representation in different systems of government and inter-institutional relations, which determine them. Instead, the second one concerns the distinction among defining the systems of government on the basis of indicators of their institutional variability and institutional variability within certain systems of government, including semi-presidential one¹⁴.

Accordingly, as J. Cheibub argues, it was initially obvious that definition of semi-presidentialism (at least as a political rather than a constitutional type) is not always sufficient, as it is not always able to satisfactorily and comprehensively characterize the functioning of this system of government¹⁵. *On the one hand*, semi-presidential systems are considered to be valid and functional if presidents, whose positions are interpreted as desirable and determined by the competitive nature of political process¹⁶, have effective (constitutional or political) powers in the process of governmental cabinets' formation and resignation/termination, actively participate in governance and public administration and are at least partially considered to be responsible for the nature, features and consequences of politics (as in Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, etc.). *On the other hand*, semi-presidential systems are

¹⁰ Duverger M., *Echec au Roi*, Wyd. Albin Michel 1978.; Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, "European Journal of Political Research" 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.; Duverger M., Avril P., *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Presses Universitaires de France 1986.

¹¹ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

¹² Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 59.

¹³ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

¹⁴ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, "French Politics" 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Philadelphia 2006.

¹⁵ Cheibub J., Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work, "Texas Law Review" 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.; Cheibub J., *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009.

¹⁶ Siaroff A., *Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2000, s. 105.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy*, [w:] Przeworski A., Stokes S., Manin B. (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 279–281.

also considered to be valid and functional, even when presidential elections are secondary and uncompetitive, as a result popularly elected presidents are commonly perceived as “the nominal heads of state and the symbols of unity” rather than “political leaders”¹⁷, inherited in the fact that the systems of inter-institutional relations are positioned and function as parliamentary one (as in Austria, Czechia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, etc.). In general, this means that identifying constitutions and constitutional systems of government as semi-presidential ones does not really guarantee that they function semi-presidentially in political practice. It is helpful in this context to take into account the role of the institutions of president and the legislature in the processes of governmental cabinets’ formation, functioning and responsibility and the organization of political process in the framework of constitutional semi-presidentialism. According to G. Sartori¹⁸, this suggests that not all semi-presidential countries are determined by presidents who effectively participate in political process and share the executive with prime ministers and governmental cabinets. By analogy, there are also the cases of semi-presidentialism, where presidents significantly replace prime ministers and governmental cabinets, and therefore encroach on the principle of the executive dualism (dual executive), which is conceptually inherent in this system of government. All this motivates and assumes that *semi-presidential constitutions are important*, since they affect the way politics is deployed and political process is implemented, determine the ability of governmental cabinet to govern, the accountability and responsibility of the executive to citizens, as well as outline the parameters of political regime (democratic, autocratic or hybrid one) consolidation¹⁹.

Complementing this feature of the positioning of semi-presidentialism with an empirical (historical and current) list of its cases, for example, in Europe, R. Elgie²⁰ notes that the choice of this system of government corresponds to a wide variety of cases. For example, there are countries that have never tested the experience of democracy since the selection of semi-presidentialism, but, nevertheless, their constitutions formally meet the requirements of the analyzed system of government (as in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, etc.). There are also the cases of semi-presidentialism, which at some point of time tested the minimum level of democracy (even in the form of a hybrid political regime), but decreased into autocracy (as in Russia and historically in Armenia). In contrast, there are semi-presidential countries, which contemporary are permanently democratic ones in the electoral and liberal (i.e. maximalist) sense (as in Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, etc.) or only in the electoral (i.e. minimalist) sense (as in Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia,

¹⁷ Kristinsson G., *Iceland*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 86, 87.; Raunio T., *The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints*, “*Scandinavian Political Studies*” 2004, vol 27, nr. 2, s. 133–152.

¹⁸ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997, s. 131–132.

¹⁹ Cheibub J., *Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work*, “*Texas Law Review*” 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.; Cheibub J., *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009.

²⁰ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, etc.) (they could even be undemocratic before the relevant constitutions were adopted). Finally, the political regimes of many semi-presidential countries are permanently hybrid ones (and previously even democratic or autocratic), as they are determined by the patterns of democracy and autocracy (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and historically in Armenia and Turkey, etc.). Thus, the isolation of these and other cases raises the question of why some semi-presidential countries are more stable politically and institutionally and more efficient socially and economically than others.

Answering this question, R. Elgie and I. McMennamin²¹ argue that semi-presidentialism is not a unified constitutional and political type, as it is variably determined by inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”. For example, there are countries that have: strong (including very strong) presidents, weak prime ministers and weak legislatures; weak (including very weak) presidents, strong prime ministers and active or strong legislatures; balanced or significantly volatile over time institutions of presidents, prime ministers and legislatures, etc. Y.-S. Wu draws a similar conclusion and notes that semi-presidentialism (due to its widespread use, especially in the European countries) demonstrates a wide range of political and operational forms and procedures, which may border on parliamentarism or presidentialism or may be characterized by constant fluctuations²². Hence, an important theoretical and methodological remark on the understanding of semi-presidentialism lies in the fact that there is a wide range of variations with a different set of countries that use semi-presidential constitutions, but apply various political and inter-institutional practices. The consequence of such a heterogeneity of inter-institutional relations within the analyzed system of government is that all semi-presidential countries (including in Europe) are not a single entity, as they are systematically linked to different consequences of political process. This conclusion is confirmed by R. Elgie²³, J. Cheibub and S. Chernykh²⁴, who note that the variability of countries with a semi-presidential system of government means that there is no reason to expect that semi-presidentialism has the potential to be an independent explanatory and analytical category/variable, yielding to different types of semi-presidentialism in this role and context. This, for example, demonstrates that comparing stability and effectiveness of a list of semi-presidential countries lacks fundamental validity, especially in the context of their

²¹ Elgie R., McMennamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

²² Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

²³ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.; Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.; Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011, s. 24.

²⁴ Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?, *“Constitutional Political Economy”* 2009, vol 20, nr. 3–4, s. 202–229.; Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Constitutions and Democratic Performance in Semi-Presidential Democracies, *“Japanese Journal of Political Science”* 2008, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 269–303.

comparison with presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Accordingly, as R. Elgie²⁵ and K. Rybachok²⁶ note, the task of studying the effects and consequences of semi-presidential system of government should cover all possible systematic changes and variations within the list of semi-presidential countries and determine whether such changes and variations are related to specific consequences of inter-institutional relations and political process.

This is extremely important given that it is quite difficult or even impossible to assess the extensively changing political phenomena associated with semi-presidentialism and to identify the factors that determine its heterogeneity and typologization without taking into account the clusters of cases, which are countries with semi-presidential system government, and its main institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes²⁷. With this in mind, the main clusters of typologization of semi-presidentialism are the groups of countries that share such important patterns of structuring system of government as institutional legacy, political traditions and the history of development. In the case of semi-presidentialism, they are supplemented by such indicators as: variety of conditions and circumstances for the adoption of semi-presidential constitutions²⁸ (in particular, through the prism of the motives of the main political actors, public pressure, as well as taking into account the institutional legacy of previous periods of political development²⁹); the way and logics of responsibility of governmental cabinet and prime minister generated by the procedures of their nomination, appointment, formation and resignation by presidents and/or parliaments; the subject of concentration of maximum political power in state (president, parliament or both of them) and its support or non-support by political parties in legislature³⁰. R. Elgie³¹ averages and somewhat modifies the outlined analytical logics and identifies such ways of identifying the clusters of typologization of semi-presidentialism as various origins and sources of semi-presidentialism, variability of presidential powers in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, diversification of the party composition of the executive (and primarily of the governmental cabinet), support for the executive (especially for governmental cabinet) in legislature. Moreover, the researcher emphasizes that they are interdependent because they complement each other and create a “path dependency trajectory” of the previous development of semi-presidential system of government.

²⁵ Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.

²⁶ Rybachok K., *Alterations in Semi-Presidential Framework in Ukraine: Appointment and Dismissal Powers of the President*, Wyd. Central European University 2014.

²⁷ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

²⁸ Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 56–77.

²⁹ Frison-Roche F., *Le “modèle semi-présidentiel” comme instrument de la transition en Europe post-communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovaquie*, Bruylant 2005.

³⁰ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.

³¹ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.

The situation is also compounded by the fact that typologization of semi-presidentialism can be constructed on the basis of regional and national characteristics and clustering of the institutional legacy of countries that use the analyzed system of government. For example, it is on this basis that R. Elgie, S. Moestrup and Y.-S. Wu³² clarify and group the parameters of clustering semi-presidentialism in Europe and identify such its options as Western European semi-presidentialism and post-communist (post-Leninist) semi-presidentialism. They dichotomize systems of government based on the different nature and logics of socio-political cleavages, which determine the reasons for introduction semi-presidential systems, and therefore probably influence the choice of ways and options for distribution of powers among political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”. Thus, Western European semi-presidentialism tends to endow the legislatures with significant powers and post-communist (post-Leninist) semi-presidentialism tends to empower mainly presidents. Hence, parliamentary traditions are stronger in Western and Northern Europe and much weaker in Central-Eastern, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, such a clustering of semi-presidentialism is quite conditional, and therefore it needs to be comprehensively clarified based on a comprehensive typologization of the analyzed system of government.

Summarizing all the above, it is critical to note, as noticed by J. Johari, that Political (and Legal) Science does not have a single institutional, procedural, political and behavioral principle and criterion by which a comprehensive classification, taxonomy and typologization of systems of government, including semi-presidentialism one, can be carried out³³. This regulates that the issue of heterogeneity of semi-presidential system of government and the ways to solve it are multivariate and complex, rather than unilateral and instantaneous. Accordingly, they revolve around various factors and indicators of typologization of semi-presidentialism and not only around the widespread taxonomy, which is usually based on the division of semi-presidential systems (which are traditionally, though often erroneously, called mixed) into president-parliamentary and premier-presidential ones, in particular on the basis of taking into account the powers of presidents, parliaments and governmental cabinets (prime ministers), the way of formation, functioning and responsibility of governmental cabinet and the executive in general and the party composition of legislatures. The fact is that a detailed analysis of institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes of semi-presidentialism makes it possible to identify among the various factors of its typologization such groups of factors that mostly revolve around the problems of formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets (it is about a formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism), dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive (it is about a factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism) and the power of presidents and features of the executive dualism (it is

³² Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism: What Have We Learned?*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 264–274.

³³ Johari J., *Principles of Modern Political Science*, Wyd. Sterling Publ. Private Ltd. 1989, s. 407.

about both a formal and factual institutional, procedural, political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism). This is largely due to the fact that an important role in forming a governmental cabinet under semi-presidentialism belongs to both a president and a parliament³⁴, and therefore president may (though is not obliged to) have freedom in determining the composition of governmental cabinet, but cannot ignore the ratio of party and political composition in legislature, since when appointing or nominating a prime minister or some ministers (or forming a governmental cabinet in general) a president needs the consent (usually in the format of an investiture vote) of a parliament. Moreover, this is due to the fact that the competencies of presidents in semi-presidential systems of government always include separate (significant or insignificant) powers in the executive, which the heads of state can exercise independently or through governmental cabinets and its prime ministers. Accordingly, as J. Blondel³⁵, V. Bogdanor³⁶ and P. O'Neil³⁷ note, a president under semi-presidentialism (complementary to governmental cabinet as the highest executive institution) is the head of state who does not lack political (executive and administrative) power. At the same time, a president is not the sole and individual "ruler of state" due to the position of an influential prime minister, who is not strictly subordinate only to president, as he or she is responsible both to president and parliament or only to parliament. All these mean that inter-institutional relations between the head of state and governmental cabinet under semi-presidentialism are necessarily determined by the executive dualism. On the one hand, this proves that semi-presidentialism is an independent type of systems of government, but, on the other hand, this argues and requires detailing of variability and heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism.

Starting to outline the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, it is advisable to proceed from R. Elgie's remarks³⁸ that the definition of semi-presidentialism should avoid theoretical and methodological problems of unreliability and endogeneity, and therefore should serve as a basis for identifying variable types of the analyzed system of government. In other words, the typologization of semi-presidentialism should be carried out without reference to the powers of various political institutions and actors, but should be based exclusively on the texts of legal acts, especially national constitutions, which dispositionally outline the patterns of inter-institutional

³⁴ Lytvyn V., *Napivprezidentska systema pravlinnia: konstytutsiino-pravovi vyklyky ta perspektyvy dlia Ukrainy na foni svitovoho instytutsiinoho dosvidu*, [w:] *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy: polityko-pravovi vyklyky i perspektyvy: Vseukrainska naukovo-praktychna konferentsiia*, Wyd. LNU im. I. Franka 2014, s. 38–63.; Lytvyn V., *Napivprezidentska systema pravlinnia u konteksti respublikanskoj formy pravlinnia: typologizatsiia, konstytutsiino-pravovi i politychni vyklyky ta perspektyvy reformuvannia v Ukraini*, "Studium Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej" 2014, nr. 2, s. 156–181.

³⁵ Blondel J., *Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability*, [w:] Kavanagh D., Finer S., Peele G. (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*. Boulder 1984, s. 162–172.

³⁶ Bogdanor V., *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.

³⁷ O'Neil P., *Presidential power in post-communist Europe: the Hungarian case in comparative perspective*, "Journal of Communist Studies" 1993, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 177–201.

³⁸ Elgie R., McMenamin I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.

relations within the system of government. Complementing this logics and conditionality of the typologization of semi-presidentialism, S. Choudhry and R. Stacey³⁹ note that options/ways of structuring relations between the executive and parliament or inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament” in general can be the basic factors of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism. They are usually reduced to such major issues as the features of governmental cabinets’ formation, the features of governmental cabinets’ resignation and responsibility, the parameters of legislative control over the activities of governmental cabinets, the possibility of dissolutions of parliaments and holding their early elections, the patterns of the legislative process and control of the agenda (veto powers of presidents, the powers to issue decrees with the force of law, the features of budget adoption, the powers in martial law and state of emergency, the features of announcing referendums), the appointing powers and powers in the field of defense and foreign policy (a detailed list of issues is given in table 1).

Interestingly that the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Shugart and J. Carey⁴⁰ is positioned as the main and classical in this context. Scholars distinguish such types of semi-presidentialism as president-parliamentarism (that is president-parliamentary system, president-parliamentary semi-presidentialism) and premier-presidentialism (that is premier-presidential system, premier-presidential semi-presidentialism; parliament-presidentialism is often considered as an analogy in other languages) mainly on the basis of taking into account the peculiarities of the appointment and dismissal of prime ministers and ministers, as well as the responsibilities of governmental cabinets⁴¹. The first type is characterized by the fact that it is supplemented by the position of popularly elected president, who is formally authorized to appoint and dismiss members of governmental cabinet (and almost always to dissolve legislature or issue decrees with the force of law), and by the fact that prime minister and governmental cabinet are responsible both to legislature and president. Instead, the second type is attributed with the fact that popularly elected president is endowed with significant constitutional powers, but prime minister and governmental cabinet are the subjects of confidence and responsibility only to legislature⁴². In view of this, the distinction between the subjects of prime minister’s and governmental cabinet’s responsibility is a determining factor in the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism.

However, according to P. Schleiter and E. Morgan-Jones⁴³, this factor can be supplemented by other constitutional or normative indicators that detail the attributes of inter-institutional relations under semi-presidentialism. Considering them, we appeal first of all to such a factor of

³⁹ Choudhry S., Stacey R., *Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia*, [w:] “*NYU Law Working Papers*” 2013.

⁴⁰ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.

⁴¹ Lytvyn V., Heterohennist i faktory ta indykatory typolohizatsii napivprezidentskoi systemy derzhavnoho pravlinnia: teoretyko-metodolohichniy ziv. “*Naukovyi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy*” 2017, nr. 2 (88), s. 318–345.

⁴² Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 19–27.

⁴³ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz*, “*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism as the endowment of presidents with quite different powers in the process of nomination/appointment of prime ministers and the formation of governmental cabinets. According to scientists⁴⁴, presidents in various semi-presidential systems can: only to agree or veto parliamentary decisions on providing governmental cabinets with investiture votes; to nominate candidates for prime minister or options of governmental cabinets who are subjected to parliamentary votes of investiture; to independently appoint prime ministers without the consent (investiture) of legislatures. By analogy, semi-presidential systems differ on the basis of the constitutional powers of legislatures to control the activities of governmental cabinets, as they are divided into cases where: legislatures are dominant in this cut; legislatures are subordinate to the heads of state in this cut; the heads of state and legislatures are commensurate political actors in this cut.

The verification of the possibility of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule (or at least to dissolve the leading chambers of bicameral legislatures) is also extremely important in the context of the formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism. In this cut, all semi-presidential systems should be divided into the cases where presidents are either endowed or not endowed with such powers. As a consequence, as M. Shugart⁴⁵ argues, it is expedient to taxon semi-presidential systems on the basis of a synthesis of options of inter-institutional relations concerning the resignations of governmental cabinets and the dissolution of legislatures. With this in mind, all semi-presidential systems are divided into the following types, where: the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted only to legislatures, which cannot be dissolved by presidents ahead of schedule; the right to resign governmental cabinets is vested only in legislatures, which can be dissolved ahead of schedule by presidents; the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted both to presidents and legislatures, but the former are not authorized to dissolve the latter; the right to resign governmental cabinets is granted both to presidents and legislatures, but the former are authorized to dissolve the latter (including on the basis of non-confirmation and restriction of the decisions of parliaments on the resignation of governmental cabinets). According to the theoretical and methodological logics and on the basis of the so-called “neo-Madisonian perspective”⁴⁶, which is based on the importance of “hierarchical” (when one actor dominates another) and “transactional” (when two actors are endowed with independent sources of power and must cooperate their tasks) patterns of power and inter-institutional relations, they are respectively called parliament-like premier-presidentialism, classical premier-presidentialism (of Madisonian type), president-like president-parliamentarism and classical president-parliamentarism (of Madisonian type).

⁴⁴ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, *British Journal of Political Science* 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

⁴⁵ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 336–337.

⁴⁶ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

Table 1. Groups of factors and indicators of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of formal institutional and procedural taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The subjects of prime minister's and governmental cabinet's responsibility, the features of appointment and dismissal of government ministers	M. Shugart, J. Carey	President-parliamentarism; premier-presidentialism
Empowerment of presidents in the process of nominating/appointing prime ministers and formation of governmental cabinets	P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones	Only consent or veto on the parliamentary decision to form cabinet; nominating prime minister or forming cabinet with the consent of parliament; quite independent appointment of prime minister
The powers of legislatures to control the activities of governmental cabinets	P. Schleiter, E. Morgan-Jones	Legislatures are dominant; legislatures are subordinate to the heads of state; legislatures and the heads of state are commensurate actors
The opportunities of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	With the right of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule; without the right of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule
The features of governmental cabinets' resignations, the opportunities of presidents to dissolve legislatures ahead of schedule	M. Shugart	Parliament-like premier-presidentialism; classical premier-presidentialism; president-like president-parliamentarism; classical president-parliamentarism
The powers of presidents in the system of separation of powers, the extent of the prerogatives of parliaments, presidents and prime ministers	V. Chernov	President-parliamentarism; premier-presidentialism, parliament-presidentialism
Nomination of the heads of governmental cabinets by presidents; participation of parliaments in providing investiture votes to new governmental cabinets; the right of cabinets or prime ministers to test parliamentary confidence in governmental cabinets; the right of president to dissolve legislature and call its early elections; the right of president to convene extraordinary sessions of parliament; the right of legislative initiative by president; the right of president to promulgate acts of legislature; presidential veto powers; presidential power to issue decrees with the force of law; presidential power to initiate referendums; the right of president to independently represent the state in foreign policy; the right of president to sign international treaties; the right of president to declare a state of emergency or martial law; political immunity of president	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	Dichotomy of semi-presidentialism on the basis of confirmation or denial of the factor and indicator of its typology (yes or no)
A way to overcome a presidential veto	O. Protsyk, V. Lytvyn	No veto power is provided; 1/2 + 1 MP; 3/5 of MPs; 2/3 of MPs; veto cannot be overcome
The types of parliamentary votes of investiture in new governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Without a vote of investiture; ex-ante vote of investiture; ex-post vote of investiture; both ex-ante and ex-post votes of investiture
The types of parliamentary votes of no confidence in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Simple vote of no confidence; constructive vote of no confidence; simple and/or constructive votes of no confidence
Minimum requirements for deciding on parliamentary investiture votes for new governmental cabinets or confidence votes in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Investiture or confidence votes in governmental cabinets are not provided; negative majority; simple majority; absolute majority
Minimum requirements for deciding on parliamentary no confidence votes in existing governmental cabinets	T. Bergman, V. Lytvyn	Negative majority; simple majority; absolute majority; qualified majority

This, in turn, motivates V. Chernov to expand the classical typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Shugart and J. Carey and along with president-parliamentarism and premier-presidentialism to distinguish such a constitutional type as parliament-presidentialism (parliamentary-presidential system, parliamentary-presidential semi-presidentialism)⁴⁷. Moreover, this logics of allocating options of semi-presidentialism is conditioned not only by the formal, but also by the real or factual powers of the heads of state in the system of separation of powers and by the scope of prerogatives of parliaments, presidents and governmental cabinets/prime ministers. This, according to V. Chernov, means that presidents of semi-presidential countries are the strongest in the case of president-parliamentarism, some weaker – in the case of premier-presidentialism and the weakest – in the case of parliament-presidentialism.

Finally, in addition to the indicators of formal institutional and procedural typologization of semi-presidentialism, it is often important to take into account the fact that not all semi-presidential countries require the official nomination of the heads of governmental cabinets by presidents. By analogy, not all semi-presidential countries regulate the participation of parliaments (or their leading chambers) in granting investiture votes to new governmental cabinets, as well as the right of governmental cabinets or prime ministers to raise questions about parliamentary confidence in existing governmental cabinets. It is also important that according to the types of parliamentary votes of investiture for governmental cabinets, it is expedient to divide semi-presidential countries into cases where they are not involved or are involved in ex-ante, ex-post or both ex-ante and ex-post formats. In turn, all semi-presidential countries can be categorized into those that use simple, constructive or both simple and constructive votes of no confidence in existing governmental cabinets. According to the rules of decision-making on parliamentary votes of investiture in new cabinets or confidence in existing cabinets, semi-presidential systems are usually divided into those where: there are no votes of investiture and/or confidence in cabinets or there are used negative, simple or absolute majority rules. As for the rules and requirements for decision-making on parliamentary votes of no confidence in existing governments, then semi-presidentialism goes to the cases with negative, simple, absolute or qualified majority rules. The formal institutional and procedural heterogeneity of semi-presidentialism is also complemented by many dichotomies regarding the verification of such attributes of this system of government as the possibility of president to dissolve legislature and call its early elections, to convene extraordinary sessions of parliament, to have the right of legislative initiative, to promulgate parliamentary acts, to have the right of legislative veto, to issue decrees with the force of law, to initiate referendums, to represent country in foreign policy and sign international treaties, to declare a state of emergency or martial law, to have political immunity, etc. In addition, semi-presidentialism can be variable based on how legislature can overcome the presidential legislative veto, because there are systems where there is no

⁴⁷ Chernov V., *Sistemyi pravleniya v Evrope: klassifikatsiya i sravnitelnyy analiz na primere stran Evrosoyuza*, "Politiya" 2008, vol 1 (48), s. 142–159.

presidential veto and systems where veto can be overcome by 1/2 + 1 MP, 3/5 MP or 2/3 MPs or cannot be overcome at all.

As for the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, they, in contrast to formal factors, are determined mostly by the real powers of political institutions and patterns of relations between them, especially in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, including, as noted by M. Shugart and J. Carey⁴⁸, as well as A. Siaroff⁴⁹, based on the taking into account the results of elections and compositions of legislatures. In this regard, it is worth noting that historically the first factual political and behavioral typologizations of semi-presidentialism belong to M. Duverger, G. Sartori, F. Frison-Roche, G. Pasquino, R. Martinez and B. Nica, who initiated scientific research on placing the institutions of president and governmental cabinet (prime minister) in the environment of distribution and composition of parties in legislature (a detailed list of issues is given in table 2).

For example, M. Duverger⁵⁰ and G. Sartori⁵¹ are known to have singled out semi-presidential systems of divided and undivided (unified) government, considering primarily whether president and prime minister enjoy the support of majority in legislature. By analogy and interpreting semi-presidentialism as an “instrument of transition”⁵² of systems of government, F. Frison-Roche proposed and tested a scheme that describes political and behavioral variations in the powers of presidents depending on their relationship with governmental cabinets, prime ministers and parliamentary majority⁵³. Because of this, the scientist taxonomized semi-presidential system of government mainly on the basis of determining and taking into account the political position of presidents in relation to majority in legislatures. A similar result and a similar theoretical and methodological logics were achieved by G. Pasquino who dichotomized all cases of semi-presidentialism onto the systems of presidential support or non-support in legislatures⁵⁴. In turn, B. Nica by a similar logic, but more optionally and structurally, identified the options of semi-presidentialism, where: president enjoys the support of single-party majority in legislature; president enjoys the support of coalition majority in legislature; president is opposed by a cohesive/coherent majority in legislature; president is opposed by a fragmented majority in legislature⁵⁵. Finally, a similar

⁴⁸ Shugart M., Carey J. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

⁴⁹ Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

⁵⁰ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 186.

⁵¹ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

⁵² Frison-Roche F., *Le “modèle semi-présidentiel” comme instrument de la transition en Europe post-communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Bruylant 2005.

⁵³ Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 68.

⁵⁴ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.

⁵⁵ Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998, s. 19.

conclusion was reached in the scientific researches of R. Martinez, who argued that based on the comparing the party affiliation of presidents and the composition of political parties of the majority in legislatures, semi-presidentialism can be trichotomized into the systems according, where: parliamentary majority is created and functions in favor of president; parliamentary majority is created and functions against president; parliamentary majority is created and functions in support of president, but against his or her leadership in the executive and political system⁵⁶.

The result of the early factual political and behavioral taxonomies of semi-presidential system of government was the typologization by S. Skach⁵⁷. This researcher, based on the assumption that semi-presidentialism recognizes the possibility of the coexistence of two “executives” (two centers of the executive), that is president and prime minister, managed to clarify the impact of dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive on the analyzed system of government. On this basis, it was argued that the dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, as well as the legitimacy and responsibility of the two centers of the executive in semi-presidentialism, are significantly different, since prime minister and governmental cabinet necessarily depend on the procedures of delegation of powers by parliament and are responsible to it, but president is instead autonomous from legislature and can act in the absence of its support. Accordingly, the tense relations among presidents, prime ministers/governmental cabinets and parliaments are unconditional, since they are caused and determined by the structure of semi-presidentialism⁵⁸. However, it is expedient to subject these structures of semi-presidentialism to taxonomy on the basis of different options of coexistence (balances, imbalances, conflicts) of the centers of the executive, as a result of which S. Skach singled out such types of semi-presidentialism as unified/consolidated majority system, divided majority system and divided minority system.

The first option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of unified/consolidated majority system and the least conflicting one, assumes that the head of state is a member or supporter of the party of prime minister, so that president and prime minister are supported by an identical parliamentary majority or majority in legislature. Such a scenario can be described by the procedures of alternation or successive change of representatives of different parties in power, and it traditionally (but not necessarily, depending on the inter-party and intra-party structuring of political process) argues that president or prime minister is considered as the “undisputed leader of the nation”. Moreover, the cases where presidents are the “leaders of the nations” and prime ministers are “the heads of presidential staffs” are still more common⁵⁹. As a consequence, the logics of presidential system of government prevails in such an option of semi-presidentialism.

⁵⁶ Martinez R., *Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions 1999.

⁵⁷ Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93–121.

⁵⁸ Lytvyn V., *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatyvnyi riznovyd napyvprezidentalizmu: perevirka dotsibnosti vyokremlemnia ta kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy zvitnoi naukovoï konferentsii filozofskoho fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117–122.

⁵⁹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 171,172.

Table 2. Groups of factors and indicators of factual political and behavioral taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of factual political and behavioral taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The support of president by the majority in legislature	M. Duverger, G. Sartori	Divided government systems; undivided (unified) government systems
The scope of presidential powers, president's relationship with governmental cabinet/prime minister and parliamentary majority	F. Frison-Roche	Based on the outlining and taking into account the political position of presidents regarding the majority in legislatures
The support of president by the majority in legislature	G. Pasquino	Systems of presidential support in legislatures; systems of presidential non-support in legislature
Support or non-support of president in legislature	B. Nica	President enjoys the support of single-party majority in legislature; president enjoys the support of coalition majority in legislature; president is opposed by a cohesive majority in legislature; president is opposed by a fragmented majority in legislature
The party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties of the majority in legislature	R. Martinez	Parliamentary majority in favor of president; parliamentary majority against president; parliamentary majority in support of president, but against his or her leadership in the executive and political system
Dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, legitimacy and responsibility of the centers of the executive, the party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	S. Skach	Unified/consolidated majority system; divided majority system; divided minority system
The party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	A. Garrido	President heads a party or coalition that has a majority in legislature; the majority in legislature is in opposition to president; there is no majority in legislature, and minority governmental cabinets predominate
Dualism and constitutional ambiguity of the executive, the party affiliation of president, the composition of political parties in legislature	V. Lytvyn	Unified/consolidated majority system; divided majority system; divided minority system; unified/ consolidated minority system
The scope of presidential powers, presidential-parliamentary relations, the configuration of party system	Y.-S. Wu	Quasi-parliamentarism; the predominance of president; compromise; alternation + based on the roles of presidents as "brokers", "partners", "layout designers", "commanders"
Powers of presidents, the composition of political parties in legislature, the ability to determine the agenda of the legislative process in legislature	T. Jung-Hsiang	President-dominant; parliament-dominant; prime minister-dominant; cohabitation; balanced + scenarios of semi-presidentialism: strong president against strong parliament; strong president against weak parliament; weak president against strong parliament; weak president against weak parliament

The second option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of divided majority system and a moderately conflicting one, assumes that the head of state, unlike prime minister, is not endowed with the support of majority in legislature. This case is defined by the procedures of the so-called “cohabitation”, when the most important executive decisions are traditionally (but not necessarily) made by the prime minister. As a result, the logics of parliamentary system of government prevails in this option of semi-presidentialism. However, in contrast, cohabitation sometimes strengthens political and behavioral powers of presidents rather than prime ministers.

Finally, the third option of semi-presidentialism, in particular in the form of divided minority system and the most conflicting one, assumes that neither president nor prime minister (and no one in this sense at all) has the support of majority in legislature, but provided that the and prime minister are political opponents of each other. This case synthesizes the attributes of the most problematic model of presidential system of government (that is a system of divided government) with the most problematic model of parliamentary system of government (that is a system of minority government), when president is party-separated from parliament and prime minister, but legislature is internally divided and excessively fragmented itself⁶⁰.

The logics of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism proposed by S. Skach is largely repeated, but essentially supplemented in the scientific works of A. Garrido⁶¹. The researcher correlates unified (consolidated) majority systems, divided majority systems and divided minority systems, accordingly, with the cases where: a) president leads or is able to lead a party or coalition that has a majority in legislature; b) the majority formed in legislature is in opposition (in the form of cohabitation or coexistence) to president; c) there is no clear form of majority in legislature, but situations of minority governmental cabinets’ formation prevail. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the outlined theoretical and methodological series of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism in the presentation by S. Skach, as well as the case of typologization of semi-presidentialism in the presentation by A. Garrido are hypothetically and empirically incomplete or need clarification. It is theoretically clear and empirically established that there is such an option of semi-presidential system of government (it should be called unified (consolidated) minority systems), when neither president nor prime minister (and no one in this sense) has the support of parliamentary majority or majority in legislature, but president and prime minister both are the members of the same party, are associated with the same party or are political allies of each other⁶². Consequently, unified (consolidated) minority systems are not necessarily determined by greater conflict in the system of the

⁶⁰ Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, *“International Journal of Constitutional Law”* 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 104–105.

⁶¹ Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, World Congress of the IPSA, Santiago de Chile 2009.

⁶² Lytvyn V., *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatynnyi riznovyd napiu prezylentalizmu: perevirka dotsihnosti vyokremlemnia ta kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy zvitnoi naukovo konferentsii filosofskoho fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117–122.

executive dualism than divided majority systems and divided minority systems, although they are inferior in their stability compared to unified (consolidated) majority systems.

Finally, supplementing the consideration of the factual political and behavioral typologization of semi-presidentialism, it is expedient to appeal to the taxonomies by T. Jung-Hsiang and Y.-S. Wu, who also argue that the formal powers of presidents are not always consistent with their real political powers. In this regard, at least three scenarios of the ratio of formal powers and real political power of presidents are theoretically possible: a) when president has strong formal powers and controls parliamentary majority, then the former has the greatest political power; b) when president has weak formal powers, but controls parliamentary majority, then the former still has considerable political power; c) when president has strong formal powers, but does not control parliamentary majority, then political power of the former is severely weakened. Imposing the above-mentioned features of the factual political and behavioral positioning of semi-presidentialism on the ability of major political institutions to determine the order of legislative process in parliament, T. Jung-Hsiang⁶³ identifies five types or scenarios/phases of the analyzed system of government, i.e. president-dominant, parliament-dominant, prime minister-dominant, cohabitational and balanced ones. Moreover, the researcher proposes four scenarios of inter-institutional relations, which are able to determine the dynamics of the political positioning of the head of state and parliament: semi-presidentialism with the institutions of strong president against strong parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of strong president against weak parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of weak president against strong parliament; semi-presidentialism with the institutions of weak president against weak parliament. By a similar logic, however on the basis of such indicators of the typologization of semi-presidentialism as the scope (significant or insignificant) of the powers of presidents, president-parliamentary (congruent/cohesive or non-congruent/non-cohesive) relations and the configuration (biparty or multiparty) of party system, Y.-S. Wu⁶⁴ identifies such types or scenarios/phases of implementation of the analyzed system of government as quasi-parliamentarism, the predominance of president, compromise and alternation. In addition, the scholar complements the typologization of semi-presidentialism with hypothetical roles of presidents (based on their appointing powers), in particular as “brokers”, “partners”, “layout designers” and “commanders”.

Lastly, as for the factors and indicators, logics and structuring of the formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy of semi-presidentialism, then they largely combine the above-mentioned attributes and features of other

⁶³ Jung-Hsiang T., Sub-Types of Semi-Presidentialism and Political Deadlock, *French Politics* 2008, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 63–84.

⁶⁴ Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.; Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism and Nascent Democracies as a Research Agenda*, Paper presented at the XX World Congress of the IPSA, Fukuoka 2006; Wu Y.-S., *Exploring the “Power-Sharing” Mode of Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the 1st IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2011; Wu Y.-S., *Management of Incongruence in Semi-Presidentialism: Taiwan and Beyond*, Paper Presented at the 22nd World Congress of the IPSA, Madrid 2012.

groups of taxonomies. At the same time, their main attribute is to take into account the correlation of formal and factual powers of different political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, but with a predominance of the emphasis on the institution of president. This implies that semi-presidentialism in the proposed group of taxonomies is topologized primarily on the basis of determining the formal and factual status and powers of the head of state. We can notice this in the researches of such scientists as M. Duverger, V. Bogdanor, A. Lijphart, A. Siaroff, Y.-C. Shen, O. Zaznaev and R. Elgie.

For example, the typologization of semi-presidentialism by M. Duverger⁶⁵ has already become a classic one, because the researcher taxonomized the analyzed system of government into options with strong or all-powerful president (who is endowed with broad powers), weak or nominal president (who performs only ceremonial functions) and with a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers (when president shares power with parliament). In parallel, V. Bogdanor, appealing to formal and factual powers of presidents, distinguishes three types of semi-presidentialism⁶⁶: systems, which operate according to the mechanisms and logics of presidentialism; systems, which operate according to the mechanisms and logics of parliamentarism; systems with the division of power between president and prime minister. Similarly, A. Lijphart, based on the formal and factual dominance of various political institutions in political process identifies semi-presidential systems with the dominance of presidents, semi-presidential systems with the dominance of parliaments and hybrid semi-presidential systems. M. Duverger⁶⁷ supplemented this logic with a position on the expediency of dividing all semi-presidential systems into the cases with “imaginary” and “effective” presidents and, accordingly, into the cases of incomplete and complete (full-fledged) semi-presidentialism. This idea was adopted by L. Metcalf⁶⁸ and A. Siaroff⁶⁹, who began to construct different types of semi-presidentialism based on the imposition of a conditional continuum of presidential powers from the least weak to the strongest ones with political institutions’ inter-relations. Therefore, this became the basis for the separation by Y.-C. Shen the variations of semi-presidentialism in the form of quasi-parliamentarism and quasi-presidentialism⁷⁰ (see details in table 3).

⁶⁵ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 167–177.

⁶⁶ Bogdanor V., *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.

⁶⁷ Duverger M., *La République des Citoyens*, Wyd. Ramsay 1982, s. 103–116.; Duverger M., *Le concept de régime semi-présidentiel*, [w:] Duverger M. (ed.), *Les régimes semi-présidentiels*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 8, 17.

⁶⁸ Metcalf L., Measuring Presidential Power, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 2000, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 660–685.

⁶⁹ Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

⁷⁰ Shen Y.-C., *Evolution of Semi-Presidentialism: Toward a Quasi-Parliamentary or a Quasi-Presidential System?*, Paper presented at IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference “Whatever Happened to North-South?”, Sao Paulo 2011.

Table 3. Groups of factors and indicators of formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidential system of government

The factors and indicators of formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy and typologization of semi-presidentialism	Representatives of taxonomy and typologization	The types (attributes of types) of semi-presidentialism
The correlation of formal and factual powers of various political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, especially presidents	M. Duverger	Semi-presidentialism with strong or all-powerful president; semi-presidentialism with weak or nominal president; semi-presidentialism with a balance of powers between president and governmental cabinet/prime minister
Formal and factual powers of presidents	V. Bogdanor	Semi-presidentialism, which operates according to the mechanisms and logics of presidentialism; semi-presidentialism, which operates according to the mechanisms and logics of parliamentarism; semi-presidentialism with the division of power between president and prime minister
Formal and factual dominance of various political institutions from the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament” in political process	A. Lijphart	Semi-presidential system with the dominance of president; semi-presidential system with the dominance of parliament; hybrid semi-presidential system
The correlation of formal and factual powers of various political institutions in the triangle “the head of state – governmental cabinet – parliament”, especially presidents	M. Duverger	Incomplete semi-presidentialism; complete (full-fledged) semi-presidentialism
Formal and factual powers of presidents	L. Metcalf, A. Siaroff	Types of semi-presidentialism based on a continuum of presidential powers from minimally weak to maximally strong
Formal and factual powers of presidents	Y.-C. Shen	Quasi-parliamentarism; quasi-presidentialism
The nature of political leadership, dominance model, consistency and variability of political leadership	R. Elgie	With one dominant pattern of leadership (of prime minister or president); with no dominant pattern of leadership; with a shift from one dominant pattern of leadership to another
The nature of political leadership	R. Elgie	Presidentialized or highly presidentialized semi-presidential system; prime ministerial or premierized (with a ceremonial president) semi-presidential system; balanced semi-presidential system
The nature of political leadership, dominance model, consistency and variability of political leadership	O. Zaznaev	The model of presidential domination (presidentialized semi-presidentialism); the model of domination of prime minister and parliament (premierized and parliamentarized semi-presidentialism); the model of alternation of dominance of president, prime minister and parliament (balanced semi-presidentialism)

However, the main progresses in this direction were the researches of R. Elgie, who tried to taxonomy semi-presidentialism based on the nature of political leadership in the analyzed system of government. As a result, several variable logics of the typologization of semi-presidentialism were identified. Firstly, based on the nature of the dominant model of leadership and its consistency and variability, semi-presidential systems were divided into types: with one dominant pattern of leadership (of prime minister or president, i.e. prime ministerial semi-presidential systems and presidential semi-presidential systems); with no dominant pattern of leadership or with a balanced leadership structure; with a shift from one dominant pattern of leadership to another (in particular, from president to prime minister, from balanced leadership to prime minister, etc.)⁷¹. Secondly, based on the reduction of the models of political leadership into “pure” types, the scientist identified such type as: presidentialized or highly presidentialized semi-presidential systems (with strong presidents and weak prime ministers); prime ministerial, premierized or parliamentarized semi-presidential systems (with weak or ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers); balanced semi-presidential systems or semi-presidential systems of balanced type (with a balance of powers of presidents and prime ministers, including on the basis of cohabitation)⁷². To a large extent, the proposed variability of types of semi-presidentialism was supplemented by O. Zaznaev, who singled out such scenarios as: the model of presidential domination (or presidentialized semi-presidentialism); the model of domination of prime minister and parliament (or premierized and parliamentarized semi-presidentialism); the model of alternation of dominance, when president dominates in one period of time, but prime minister and (alternatively) parliament in another one (balanced semi-presidentialism)⁷³.

In summary, the consideration of factors and indicators of typologization of semi-presidentialism allows us to argue that the general directions in this regard are to address the issue of formation and responsibility of governmental cabinets and the possibilities for the dissolution of legislatures (i.e. the formal institutional and procedural taxonomy of semi-presidentialism), dualism, legitimacy and responsibility of the executive (i.e., the factual political and behavioral taxonomy of semi-presidentialism) and the strength of presidents and the features of the executive dualism (i.e., formal and factual (institutional, procedural, political and behavioral) taxonomy of semi-presidentialism). Accordingly, this scientific article confirmed R. Elgie's⁷⁴ conclusion that various factors and indicators of diversification of semi-presidentialism may indicate that the analyzed system of government

⁷¹ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 283.

⁷² Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 282–286.

⁷³ Zaznaev O., *Klassifikatsii prezidentskoy, parlamentskoy i poluprezidentskoy sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Kazan 2006, s. 190.; Zaznaev O., *Modeli dualnoy ispolnitelnoy vlasti*, “*Uchenyye zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye nauki*” 2010, nr. 1, s. 205–211.; Zaznaev O., *Measuring Presidential Power: A Review of Contemporary Methods*, “*Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*” 2014, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 569–573.

⁷⁴ Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.

can be very multivariate, and therefore it should be considered in a complex and on the basis of permanent comparisons. This, in turn, means that hypothetically there is no reason to speak of any established and perfect model of semi-presidentialism, even if it is concentrated in one region or one part of the world. Consequently, it makes no sense to compare semi-presidentialism as a whole, but instead it is much more efficient to appeal to its formal, factual and both formal and factual types/attributes as well as to political and socio-economic consequences caused by them. By analogy, it is not entirely expedient to appeal to semi-presidentialism on the basis of its reduction to some standard or typical case, but instead, though with a degree of conventionality, it is worth talking about certain ideal manifestations of different types of semi-presidentialism.

References

1. Bebler A., *Introduction*, [w:] Bebler A., Seroka J. (eds.), *Contemporary Political Systems. Classifications and Typologies*, Wyd. Lynne Rienner Publishers 1990, s. 6.
2. Blondel J., *Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World: A Step towards Executive and Regime Stability*, [w:] Kavanagh D., Finer S., Peele G. (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*. Boulder 1984, s. 162–172.
3. Bogdanor V., *Semi-presidential Systems*, [w:] Bogdanor V. (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Basil Blackwell Publishers 1987, s. 561–562.
4. Cheibub J., Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work, “*Texas Law Review*” 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.
5. Cheibub J., *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Wyd. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2009.
6. Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?, “*Constitutional Political Economy*” 2009, vol 20, nr. 3–4, s. 202–229.
7. Cheibub J., Chernykh S., Constitutions and Democratic Performance in Semi-Presidential Democracies, “*Japanese Journal of Political Science*” 2008, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 269–303.
8. Chernov V., Sistemyi pravleniya v Evrope: klassifikatsiya i sravnitelnyy analiz na primere stran Evrosoyuza, “*Politiya*” 2008, vol 1 (48), s. 142–159.
9. Choudhry S., Stacey R., Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia, [w:] “*NYU Law Working Papers*” 2013.
10. Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.
11. Duverger M., *Echec au Roi*, Wyd. Albin Michel 1978.
12. Duverger M., *La République des Citoyens*, Wyd. Ramsay 1982.
13. Duverger M., *Le concept de régime semi-présidentiel*, [w:] Duverger M. (ed.), *Les régimes semi-présidentiels*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 7–17.
14. Duverger M., Avril P., *Les Régimes semi-présidentiels*, Presses Universitaires de France 1986.

15. Elgie R., *Executive Leadership in Semi-Presidential Systems*, [w:] Hart P., Rhodes R.A.W. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2014, s. 472–486.
16. Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 281–299.
17. Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999.
18. Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism in Western Europe*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 81–97.
19. Elgie R., *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2011.
20. Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.
21. Elgie R., *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 1–13.
22. Elgie R., McMenemy I., *Variation Within Semi-Presidentialism: Cohabitation, Cabinet Stability and Non-Partisan Prime Ministers*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago 2007.
23. Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism: What Have We Learned?*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 264–274.
24. Frison-Roche F., *Le “modèle semi-présidentiel” comme instrument de la transition en Europe post-communiste: Bulgarie, Lituanie, Macédoine, Pologne, Roumanie et Slovénie*, Bruylant 2005.
25. Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 56–77.
26. Garrido A., *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, World Congress of the IPSA, Santiago de Chile 2009.
27. Johari J., *Principles of Modern Political Science*, Wyd. Sterling Publ. Private Ltd. 1989.
28. Jung-Hsiang T., Sub-Types of Semi-Presidentialism and Political Deadlock, *“French Politics”* 2008, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 63–84.
29. Kristinsson G., *Iceland*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 86–103.
30. Landman T., *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.
31. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy*, [w:] Przeworski A., Stokes S., Manin B. (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.
32. Linz J., *Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?*, [w:] Linz J., Valenzuela A. (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University Press 1994, s. 3–87.
33. Lytvyn V., Do otsniovannia klasychnykh i postklasychnykh ta formuluivannia onovlenoho i syntetychnoho vyznachen napivprezydentalizmu, *“Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho universytetu: Filozofia, sotsiologhiia, politologhiia”* 2016, nr. 3 (31), s. 30–46.

34. Lytvyn V., Heterohennist i faktory ta indykatory typolohizatsii napivprezydentskoi systemy derzhavnoho pravlinnia: teoretyko-metodolohichniy zriz, "Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy" 2017, nr. 2 (88), s. 318–345.
35. Lytvyn V., *Napivprezydentska systema pravlinnia: konstytutsiino-pravovi vyklyky ta perspektyvy dlia Ukrainy na foni svitovoho instytutsiinoho dosvidu*, [w:] *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy: polityko-pravovi vyklyky i perspektyvy: Vseukrainska naukovo-praktychna konferentsiia*, Wyd. LNU im. I. Franka 2014, s. 38–63.
36. Lytvyn V., Napivprezydentska systema pravlinnia u konteksti respublikanskoj formy pravlinnia: typolohizatsiia, konstytutsiino-pravovi i politychni vyklyky ta perspektyvy reformuvannia v Ukraini, "Studium Europy Srodkowej i Wschodniej" 2014, nr. 2, s. 156–181.
37. Lytvyn V., *Systema unifikovanoi menshosti yak variatyvnyi riznovyd napivprezydentalizmu: perevirka dotsilnosti vyokremлення ta kontseptualizatsii*, [w:] *Tezy zvitnoi naukovo konferentsii filozofskoho fakultetu*, Wyd. Trek-LTD 2017, s. 117–122.
38. Martinez R., *Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study*, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions 1999.
39. Metcalf L., Measuring Presidential Power, "Comparative Political Studies" 2000, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 660–685.
40. Nica B., *Comparative Institutional Analysis of Post-Communist Semi-presidential Systems: Prospectus*, Wyd. Central European University 1998.
41. O'Neil P., Presidential power in post-communist Europe: the Hungarian case in comparative perspective, "Journal of Communist Studies" 1993, vol 9, nr. 3, s. 177–201.
42. Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, "European Journal of Political Research" 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.
43. Raunio T., The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 2004, vol 27, nr. 2, s. 133–152.
44. Rybachok K., *Alterations in Semi-Presidential Framework in Ukraine: Appointment and Dismissal Powers of the President*, Wyd. Central European University 2014.
45. Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Philadelphia 2006.
46. Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.
47. Sartori G., Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, "American Political Science Review" 1970, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 1033–1053.
48. Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, "British Journal of Political Science" 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.
49. Shen Y.-C., *Evolution of Semi-Presidentialism: Toward a Quasi-Parliamentary or a Quasi-Presidential System?*, Paper presented at IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference "Whatever Happened to North-South?", Sao Paulo 2011.

50. Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.
51. Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.
52. Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.
53. Siaroff A., *Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, Wyd. Taylor & Francis 2000.
54. Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.
55. Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, “*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 93–121.
56. Wu Y.-S., *Clustering of Semi-Presidentialism: A First Cut*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave 2011, s. 21–41.
57. Wu Y.-S., *Exploring the “Power-Sharing” Mode of Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the 1st IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo 2011.
58. Wu Y.-S., *Management of Incongruence in Semi-Presidentialism: Taiwan and Beyond*, Paper Presented at the 22nd World Congress of the IPSA, Madrid 2012.
59. Wu Y.-S., *Semi-Presidentialism and Nascent Democracies as a Research Agenda*, Paper presented at the XX World Congress of the IPSA, Fukuoka 2006.
60. Zaznaev O., *Klassifikatsii prezidentskoy, parlamentskoy i poluprezidentskoy sistem*, [w:] Farukshin M. (ed.), *Dinamika politicheskikh sistem i mezhdunarodnyih odnosheniy*, Kazan 2006, s. 186–210.
61. Zaznaev O., Measuring Presidential Power: A Review of Contemporary Methods, “*Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*” 2014, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 569–573.
62. Zaznaev O., Modeli dualnoy ispolnitelnoy vlasti, “*Uchenyie zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyie nauki*” 2010, vol 152, nr. 1, s. 205–211.